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Abstract—The paper investigates the suitability of model
checker based testing techniques for contract monitoring and
enforcing services. In particular a contract monitoring service
called Contract Compliance Checker (CCC) is considered as the
system under test. The CCC is provided with an executable
specification of the contract in force and is able to determine
whether the actions of the business partners are consistent with
respect to the contract. Contractual interactions can give rise
to highly complex execution traces, and it is quite unrealistic to
assume that such traces can be produced manually for testing
purposes. The paper describes how a model checker can be
used effectively at design time to validate the consistency of the
contractual clauses and later, to produce test case validation
sequences to test the correctness of the actual implementation.
Keywords-electronic contracts; automated testing; model
checking;
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider electronic contracting systems intended to
provide mechanisms for regulating contractual interactions.
By regulation we mean monitoring and/or enforcement of
business–to–business (B2B) interactions to ensure that the
business partners are performing actions that are compliant
with the electronic contract in force, detecting violations of
contract clauses and determining liability, enforcing sanc-
tions or given allowances and facilitating dispute resolution,
by providing audit trail of business interactions [1], [2].
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Figure 1. Contract regulated interaction.
We primarily focus on the terms and conditions of B2B
legal contracts concerned with purchase orders fulfilment,
supply chain management etc., rather than service level
agreements (SLAs) that specify quality of service, such as
bandwidth and response time (although we believe that the
ideas of this paper can be extended to cover SLAs as well).
Within this context, we consider an independent, third party
contract monitoring service called Contract Compliance
Checker (CCC). The CCC (see Fig. 1 which depicts the
logical communication paths between business partners and
the CCC) is provided with an executable specification of the
contract in force; it is able to observe and log the relevant
B2B interaction events which it processes to determine
whether the actions of the business partners are consistent
with respect to the contract.
Naturally, it is important to ensure that the CCC itself
acts correctly. This in turn implies validating the correctness
of the executable contract. Contract clauses can (and do)
contain a variety of constraints to do with timing and
relative ordering of operations together with exceptional
clauses that specify what happens if the primary clause is
violated (breached); these factors make them quite hard to
validate. To this end we are interested in developing high–
level testing tools for contract monitoring and enforcing
services, such as the CCC. Our investigations, reported here,
describe how a model checker can be used effectively for
automated generation of test cases. Although model checker
based testing techniques have received wide attention in the
software engineering community [3]–[5], their use in testing
of contract monitoring and enforcing services has received
little attention.
The basic idea behind model checker based testing is
simple and elegant: construct a behaviour model of the
system under test (SUT) and validate the behaviour using a
model checker ( e.g., use Promela language for constructing
the model and verify using SPIN, [6]). Such a validated
model can then be used for generating executable test cases
for the SUT; the model also acts as an oracle, since it
also indicates the expected outputs the SUT should produce
under given conditions. A principal challenge here is the
construction of a model that is sufficiently small (abstract,
simple) to enable, as far as possible, exhaustive checking
(full validation) by the model checker; at the same time, the
model should be realistic enough to be able to generate test
cases that exercise the SUT.
The SUT in our case is the rule based CCC service that
we have implemented that relies on the Drools rule engine
[7] for rule management. For the CCC, we have also imple-
mented a contract specification language called EROP (for
Events, Rights, Obligations and Prohibitions), that provides
constructs to specify what rights, obligation and prohibitions
become active and inactive after the occurrence of events
related to the execution of business operations [8], [9].
We describe how the CCC can be modelled as a reactive
system, converted into Promela and validated with Spin to
observe properties of interest which are regarded as safety
(something bad will never happen) and liveness (something
good will eventually happen) properties. We are able to
check properties specific to a given contract, e.g., deadline
extensions are granted exactly as stated in the clauses and
so forth. We are able to build the CCC model at a suffi-
ciently high level of abstraction to keep the state explosion
problem under control, and yet produce test sequences that
are realistic enough for the SUT. We describe how the
implemented version of the CCC was instrumented to accept
test sequences and produce outputs. Overall, we have found
model checker based testing techniques to be a very effective
way of automating the testing of contracting systems.
The paper is structured as follows: section two contains
the background material, including a sample contract that
will be used as the running example. This is followed by
section three that describes the architecture of the CCC;
model checking and test case generation is described in
section four; section five describes how the implemented
version of the CCC can be tested. Related work is described
in section six and concluding remarks, including directions
for further work are presented in section seven.
II. BACKGROUND
Let us have a look at a hypothetical example of a
contract written in legal English. Although this contract is
not comprehensive (for example, invoicing is not stipulated),
it does contain clauses of considerable degree of complexity
to serve as a running example. Notice that exceptional
clauses are executed to impose sanctions or grant allowances
to the offender, depending on the problem that cause the
violation of the primary clause. Our EROP language is
particularly suited to the specification of such exceptional (or
contingency) clauses that come in force when the delivery
obligation stated in the ’primary clause’ is not fulfilled
(breach or violation of the contract).
As we have argued elsewhere [9], exceptional clauses in
electronic contracts should be structured appropriately to
take account of messaging problems. Our study of B2B
messaging standards such as ebXML [10], RosettaNet [11],
BizTalk [12] suggests that at the highest level of specifi-
cation (e.g., legal English), such problems can be referred
to as business problems (problems caused by semantic
errors in business messages, preventing their processing) and
technical problems (problems caused by faults in networks
and hardware/software components).
1.OFFERS AND PURCHASE ORDERS
1.1 The seller is entitled to send an offer to
the buyer.
1.2 The buyer has the right to use its sole dis-
cretion to ignore an offer or respond to it
by submitting a corresponding purchase order.
1.3 Failure to respond to the offer within 10
days shall complete the contractual transac-
tion.
2.DISCOUNTS
2.1 The seller agrees to grant 15% discount to
purchase orders submitted within 7 days of
the receipt of the offer.
2.2 A purchase order submitted after 7 days
(but not exceeding 10 days) will be proce-
ssed but granted no discount unless clauses
4.1 or 4.2 apply.
2.3 Purchase orders submitted after 10 days
will not be processed online.
3.PAYMENT
3.1 The buyer is obliged to submit payment within
5 days of sending the purchase order.
3.2 Payments made after 5 days will incur 10%
fine and, if submitted, not considered for
online processing, unless clause 4.3 applies.
4.DELAYED PURCHASE ORDERS AND PAYMENTS
4.1 A delayed purchase order due to business rea-
sons shall be granted only 10% discount.
4.2 A delayed purchase order due to technical
problems shall be granted 15% discount.
4.3 Failure to meet a payment deadline due to
business or technical reasons will grant:
4.3.1 a payment deadline extension of 5 days
to the buyer.
4.3.2 right of purchase order cancellation to
the seller.
5.CANCELLATIONS AND REFUNDS
5.1 The seller is obliged to refund payments re-
ceived after cancellations.
6. Number of FAILURES
6.1 If the total number of business and technical
failures exceed an agreed bound, then online
processing will be terminated.
We summarise the overall development process that is
described in detail in the rest of the paper. The starting
point is a contract in a natural language, such as the
one just considered. From this, an executable version in
EROP is developed and installed in the CCC which then
becomes the SUT. For the same natural language contract, a
Promela model of the CCC is developed and validated with
respect to contract specific correctness requirements (such as
termination in acceptable final states, checking that deadline
extensions have been granted exactly as stated in the clauses,
refund has taken place properly and so forth). This validated
model is then used for generating test cases and applying
them to the SUT as discussed subsequently.
We assume that interaction between partners takes place
through a well defined set of primitive business operations
such as purchase order submission, invoice notification, and
so on; each operation typically involves the transfer of one
or two business documents. A business operation is imple-
mented by a business conversation: a well defined message
interaction protocol with stringent message timing and va-
lidity constraints (normally, a business message is accepted
for processing only if it is timely and satisfies specific syn-
tactic and semantic validity constraints). RosettaNet Partner
Interface Processes and ebXML industry standards serve as
good examples of such conversations. Following the ebXML
specification [10], we assume that once a conversation is
started, (i.e., a business operation is initiated) it always
completes to produce an execution outcome event from the
set {Success, BizFail, TecFail} whose elements represent
respectively a successful conclusion, a business failure or
a technical failure. BizFail and TecFail events model the
(hopefully rare) execution outcomes when, after a successful
initiation, a party is unable to reach the normal end of a
conversation due to exceptional situations. TecFail models
protocol related failures detected at the middleware level,
such as a late, syntactically incorrect or a missing message.
BizFail models semantic errors in a message detected at
the business level, e.g., the goods-delivery address extracted
from the business document is invalid.
We assume that the business partners have been instru-
mented to generate a business event upon the execution of
a business operation. Each such event contains information
that includes the termination status (Success, BizFail or
TecFail), name of the operation, the timestamp and other
attributes to classify the operation further (for example, for a
payment operation, what discount is used). The monitoring
channel delivers these events to the CCC exactly once in
temporal order; these events are logged at the CCC.
Informally, an execution sequence or execution trace is
a sequence of business operations executed by the business
partners that drive the interaction from its initial to a final
state. The CCC will have a record of the trace in its event
log. The CCC can examine a trace and determine whether
an event, representing a business operation is contract com-
pliant or not.
In these sequences we use the following notation:
푂퐹퐹퐸푅—offer submission, 푃푂7퐷퐴푌 —purchase order
submitted within seven days, 푃푂10퐷퐴푌 —purchase or-
der submitted within ten days, 푃푂퐶푁퐿—purchase order
cancellation, 푃퐴푌 0퐷푆퐶—payment with 0% disccount,
푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶퐸푋—payment with 15% disccount within
deadline extension, 푅퐹푁퐷—refund; likewise, we append
푆, 퐵퐹 , 푇퐹 or 푇푂 to the name of the operation, to indicate,
respectively, that the execution produced success, business
failure, technical failure or that the time out to complete
the execution expired. Finally, we use the notation 푒푖 → 푒푗
to indicate that event 푒푖 precedes event 푒푗 . For example,
푃푂7퐷퐴푌푆 → 푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶푇퐹 means that the successful
execution of a purchase order submitted within seven days
was followed by the execution of a payment entitled to 15%
discount that, unfortunately, completed in a technical failure.
In the following execution trace 푂퐹퐹퐸푅푆 →
푃푂7퐷퐴푌푆 → 푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶푆 where everything goes
smoothly (no exceptional clauses involved) from the submis-
sion of the offer to the submission of the payment with 15%
discount, all business operations are contract compliant (a
valid trace), and a correctly functioning CCC should indicate
that. Whereas, in the trace 푂퐹퐹퐸푅푆 → 푃푂10퐷퐴푌푆 →
푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶푆 the payment operation with 15% discount is
not contract compliant (only purchase order submitted within
7 days are entitled to 15% discount).
Here is a significantly more complicated trace
with all contract compliant operations, that indicates
money refund: 푂퐹퐹퐸푅퐵퐹 → 푂퐹퐹퐸푅푆 →
푃푂7퐷퐴푌푇퐹 → 푃푂7퐷퐴푌푇푂 → 푃푂10퐷퐴푌퐵퐹 →
푃푂10퐷퐴푌푆 → 푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶퐵퐹 → 푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶푇푂 →
푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶퐸푋퐵퐹 → 푃푂퐶푁퐿퐵퐹 → 푃푂퐶푁퐿푆 →
푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶퐸푋푆 → 푅퐹푁퐷퐵퐹 → 푅퐹푁퐷푆 .
In general, a valid contractual interaction can give rise to
highly complex execution traces, and it is quite unrealistic
to assume that such a traces can be produced manually for
testing purposes. Clearly there is a need for high-level testing
tools. Such tools are needed for instance, at design time
to validate the consistency of the contractual clauses and
later, to produce test case validation sequences to test the
correctness of the actual implementation.
III. THE CONTRACT COMPLIANCE CHECKER
We will first develop the notion of a contract compli-
ant operation and then describe how the CCC checks for
contract compliance. Let the set 퐵 = {푏표1, . . . , 푏표푛} of
of business operations contain all the primitive business
operations stipulated in the contract. We say that a given 푏표푖
is a valid business operation only if 푏표푖 ∈ 퐵. Informally,
a right is something that a business partner is allowed to
do; an obligation is something that a business partner is
expected to do unless they wish to take the risk of being
penalized; finally, a prohibition is something that a business
partner is not expected to do unless they are prepared to
be penalized. As the contractual interaction progresses and
operations are executed, rights, obligations and prohibitions
are granted and revoked to parties. This idea is at the heart
of the functionality of the CCC. We call ROP sets, the sets
of rights, obligations and prohibitions currently in force for
the participants, from the perspective of the CCC.
A business operation performed by a partner is said to
be contract compliant if it satisfies the following three
requirements: (i) the operation is valid; (ii) it is in the ROP
set of the partner (a matched business operation); and (iii) it
satisfies the constraints stipulated in the contractual clauses.
A business operation that fails to satisfy the first re-
quirement is called an unknown business operation and
declared non–contract–compliant without further analysis. A
business operation that satisfies the first but not the second
requirement is called a mismatched business operation and
declared non-contract-compliant without further analysis. A
matched business operation that fails to satisfy the third
requirement is called an out of context business operation
and declared non-contract-compliant.
The overall architecture of the CCC is shown in Fig. 2;
it is built on an Event Condition Action (ECA) mechanism.
As stated earlier, business events (bevents) are supplied by
the business partners to the CCC through the monitoring
channel and carry information on the undertaken business
operations.
The ROP sets stores the current set of rights obligations
and prohibitions of the buyer and seller. The bevent log-
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Figure 2. The architecture of the CCC.
ger is a permanent storage for keeping records about all
the event processed by the CCC. The bevent queue is a
queue that stores busines events until they are removed for
processing by the relevance engine. The contract rules is
the rule base repository and contains a list of ECA rules
that describe the contract in force. The events in these rules
are the bevents; whereas their conditions correspond to the
constraints imposed on the execution of business operations;
for instance, in our running example, clause 3.1 states that
payment must be performed within five days of sending the
purchase order. Some conditions such as number of failures
(see clause 6.1 ) are related to the history of the interaction,
consequently, their verification involves consultation of the
historical records (cons. hist. records) kept by the bevent
logger. The actions in the rules include the operations 푎푑푑
and 푑푒푙푒푡푒 (add/del) executed against the ROP sets to add
and delete rights, obligations and prohibitions. The effect of
an action is the update of the state of the ROP sets after the
occurrence of a bevent.
The timer keeps track of deadlines associated to each
right, obligation and prohibition stored in the ROP sets.
Deadlines are set and reset set/reset deadline timeouts by
the relevance engine. When a deadline expires, a timeout
bevent is sent to the filter mism. 푏표푖.
Bevents that arrive from the monitoring channel pass
through two filtering mechanisms before they can be stored
in the bevent queue. The filter unkn. 푏표푖 is responsible for
filtering out bevents that correspond to unknown business
operations. The filter mism. 푏표푖 is responsible for filtering
out bevents that correspond to mismatched business oper-
ations. As shown in the figure, timeout bevents are also
examined by the filter mism. 푏표푖 before they can reach the
bevent queue. A timeout bevent should be filtered out if the
corresponding 푏표푖 is in the the bevent queue or is currently
being proccessed by the relevance engine. The intention of
the filtering mechanisms is to detect and discard bevents that
correspond to non–contract compliant operations as early as
possible; thus the relevance engine deals only with bevents
that are likely to be contract compliant.
The Relevance Engine analyses queued events and triggers
any relevant rules among those it holds in its contract rules
base, following this algorithm: (i) Fetch the first event 푒
from the bevent queue; (ii) Identify the relevant rules for 푒;
and (iii) For each relevant rule 푟, execute the actions listed.
The main action here is the updating (addition and deletion
of rights, obligations and prohibitions) of the current state
of the ROP sets.
The design and implementation of the CCC and the
associated EROP language are described in [8]. That paper
also illustrates how the clauses of a contract such as the one
under consideration here would be coded using EROP, so
we will show only a sample, clause 2.1: if a purchase order
submission is successfully performed (event is 푃푂7퐷퐴푌푆)
within seven days (event timestamp is less than seven days),
then the buyer’s obligation includes making a payment with
15% discount.
#buyer submits PO within 7d and gets
# 15% discount
when e is PO7DAY_S && PO7DAY_S in buyer.rights
&& orig==buyer && e.ts<7d
then buyer.obligs+=PAY15DSC
end
IV. MODEL CHECKING AND TEST CASE GENERATION
Spin is a freely available, mature and well documented
model checker designed to validate correctness properties of
asynchronous process systems. It validates abstract models
written in Promela language against safety and liveness
correctness claims that can be expressed as basic assertions
and Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae [6]. In response
to the detection of a violation of a given property, Spin
produces counterexamples that show how the property was
violated. A counterexample is actually an execution trace
from the initial state of the model down to the state where the
violation of the property takes place. Spin can be instructed
to include in its counterexamples various features of interest
involved in the execution trace, such as the sequence of
Promela statements executed as well and the messages
sent and received. The facility that model checkers like
Spin offer to generate counterexamples can be exploited to
automatically generate test cases for the SUT. A test case is
to be understood as a set of values needed to instantiate the
input variables of the SUT for a given run. Similarly a test
suite is a set of test cases meant to test a specific correctness
requirement.
The basic idea of using model–checkers for generating
test cases is explained at large in [4], [13] and other papers;
briefly it involves four steps: 1) Build an abstract model of
the SUT; 2) Formulate the property of interest (for example,
that the SUT progresses from state 푆푖 to state 푆푗 when pre-
sented with input 푒푖) in LTL; 3) Negate the LTL, present it
to the model checker and challenge it to execute the abstract
model to show that the negated LTL claim can be violated;
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Figure 3. Promela model used for test cases generation.
as a result, the model checker produces counterexamples
that include transitions from 푆푖 to 푆푗 when 푒푖 is provided.
As explained in [14], counterexamples produced by model
checkers contain abstract parameters that are meaningful to
the asbtract model but meaningless to the SUT; thus they
serve only as raw data to produce actual test cases that can
be fed into the SUT to exercise a run.
An schematic view of the Promela model that we use
for the generation of test cases is shown in Fig. 3. The
top component (abstract model of the contract in Promela)
represents the abstract model of the CCC with the contract.
The goal of the model is to capture the behaviour of the
CCC (precisely its state transitions) as its clauses (regarded
as ECA rules) are executed. The current state is determined
by the business partners’ rights, obligations and prohibitions
currently pending. The CCC can be regarded as a typical re-
active system [15], [16] with the general form of behaviour:
when event 푒 occurs in state 퐴, if condition 푐 is true at that
time, the system transfers to state 퐵.
This model was first presented in [17] where its internal
details are discussed. It was used to validate the logical
consistency (for example, absence of deadlocks, rule con-
flicts and redundancy) of the contractual clauses expressed
as safety and liveness properties. Thus regarding its logical
consistency, we assume that the model is correct.
We present here only a brief summary of its functionality.
The Event Generator (EG) models the interaction between
the two business partners in the sense that it generates the
business events that they produce (for example, offer suc-
cessfully submitted: 푂퐹퐹퐸푅푆 , purchase order submission
operation performed within seven days suffered a business
failure: 푃푂7퐷퐵퐹 etc.). These events are sent to the Rule
Manager through the 퐸퐺2푅푀 channel. The Rule Manager
(RM) models the rule engine as it is responsible for pro-
cessing the events and selecting potential matching rules.
푅1, 푅2, ..., 푅푁 represent the contractual clauses modeled
as ECA–rules. Relevant rules are loaded by the Promela
inline inclusion statement. The main action of a rule is an
update (add/delete rights, obligations and prohibitions) of the
buyer’s and seller’s ROPsets; in addition, the action might
also change the state of other global variables like counters
which can be used as conditions in the ECA rules. The
buyer’s and seller’s ROPsets are bit–vectors that represent
the current right, obligations and prohibitions of the business
partners; they are global variables. The status (contract
compliant or non–contract compliant) of the execution of
a given event is notified to the EG through the RM2EG
channel.
A. Generation of test cases
The components outside the model of the contract are
extensions to support the generation of tests cases. As shown
in the figure, to produce a counterexample, the designer
needs to provide the abstract model of the contract with a
correctness property expressed in LTL. The CounterExample
To ExecutionSequence component is a filtering mechanism
used for filtering out irrelevant information from counterex-
amples. The current implementation is a Java programme
rich in regular expressions.
The length of the sequences and the status of their
events (unknown, matched, mismatched, out of context and
contract compliant) depend on two factors: i) the constraints
imposed by the contractual clauses that might dictate, for
example, to terminate the contract if more that 푁 unknown
or mismatched events are generated by the business partners;
ii) the configuration of the event generator which can be
tuned to generate sequences that fall into one of four possible
categories:
1) Sequences that can include events of all possible sta-
tus: unknown, matched and mismatched, non–contract
compliant, contract–compliant. This is the most gen-
eral case. If the contract dictates that the contract
should be terminated upon the detection of the third
unknown event, these sequences will include at most
three unknown events.
2) Sequences with events corresponding to execution of
matched and mismatched business operations. These
sequences model the situation when the business part-
ners intentionally or accidentally ignore the current
status of the interaction and select to execute any
business operation —not necessarily in the ROP sets—
from within the set 퐵. The event generator can be
easily tuned not to generate unknown business events.
3) Sequences with events corresponding to execution
of matched business operations only. This alternative
models the situation when the business partners are
aware of the current content of the ROP sets and
execute only operations that correspond to pending
rights, obligations and prohibitions, but that do not
necessarily satisfy the conditions on the ECA–rules.
To generate these sequences the designer has to tune
the event generator to consult the ROP sets before gen-
erating its next event. This explains why the ROPsets
are modelled by global variables in the abstract model.
4) Sequences with events corresponding to the execution
of contract compliant operations only. This is the
most restricted alternative and models the situation
where the business partners have accurate information
about their rights and obligations and any constraints
on the business operations (in the model this means
knowledge of current state of the ROPsets and other
global variables used in the conditions of the ECA
rules). To generate these sequences the event generator
has to be tuned to consult the current state of the
ROPsets and the global variables, before it generates
the next event.
It is worth clarifying that different sequences of events
are used to test different properties of the SUT. We would
be most interested in testing the behaviour of the CCC when
presented with sequences of type 3 and 4; the justification
is that we assume that unknown and mismatched events are
removed by the filtering mechanisms (see Fig. 2) before
they reach the rule engine (and it is relatively easy to test
the adequacy of these filtering mechanisms). For type 4
sequence, this means the generated test cases may include
events corresponding to the execution of contract compli-
ant business operations (where the status of each business
operation could be: successful, business failure, technical
failure) and timeout events, corresponding to non–execution
of business operations. Note that, as long as they are within
the constraints expressed in the contract, the events with
technical or business failures or timeouts are treated as
contract compliant.
To illustrate, we consider the generation of type 4 se-
quences, where we use the following interpretation of clause
6.1: for online processing to continue, each business op-
eration can suffer at most one failure (business failure or
technical failure). Let us say that the designer is interested
in testing that the CCC behaves correctly when clause 2.1 is
executed; precisely, he would like to test that the buyer gets
15% discount when he successfully submits his purchase
order within seven days. Such a requirement can be tested
by a test suite composed of execution sequences that include
the two operations under examination, namely, purchase
order submitted within seven days (PO7DAY) and payment
with 15% discount (PAY15DSC). We generate such a test
suit with the assistance of the abstract model of Fig. 3.
Firstly, we regard the correctness requirement as a liveness
property that stays that when a PO7DAY is successfully
executed, successful operation PAY15DSC will eventualy
follow. Secondly, we express the liveness property in LTL as
[]푃푂7퐷퐴푌푆 →<> 푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶푆 , where [], → and <>
are the conventional LTL operators, always, implication and
eventually, respectively. Thirdly, we present the model with
the negation of the LTL and instruct it to run.
The result is a set of 60 counterexamples including
redundant ones. Notice that there are techniques to reduce
both the number of counter examples and their length [18].
In this order, the sequence 푂퐹퐹퐸푅푆 → 푃푂7퐷퐴푌푆 →
푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶푆 represents the shortest execution from the
test suit, whereas the sequence
푂퐹퐹퐸푅퐵퐹 → 푂퐹퐹퐸푅푆 → 푃푂7퐷퐴푌푇퐹 →
푃푂7퐷퐴푌푆 → 푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶퐵퐹 → 푃퐴푌 15퐷푆퐶푆 , is one
of the longest.
Similarly, negation of the following LTL formula
[]푃푂10퐷퐴푌푆 →<> 푃퐴푌 10퐷푆퐶푆 can be presented to
the model to generate test cases for clause 4.1 (namely, a
delayed purchase order due to business reasons shall be
granted only 10% discount). Here is one of the longest
sequences generated; in all these sequences, a 푃푂7퐷퐴푌푇푂
event is preceded by a 푃푂7퐷퐴푌퐵퐹 event and succeeded
by a 푃퐴푌 10퐷푆퐶푆 event (this behaviour is guaranteed
by the validated model). In the sequence shown, offer and
discount payment operations suffer failures (first and seventh
events, respectively) but eventually succeed (second and
last events, respectively). 푂퐹퐹퐸푅퐵퐹 → 푂퐹퐹퐸푅푆 →
푃푂7퐷퐴푌퐵퐹 → 푃푂7퐷퐴푌푇푂 → 푃푂10퐷퐴푌퐵퐹 →
푃푂10퐷퐴푌푆 → 푃퐴푌 10퐷푆퐶퐵퐹 → 푃퐴푌 10퐷푆퐶푆 .
V. TESTING
Since we assume that the abstract model is correct, it is
reasonable to expect that a correctly functioning CCC should
consume (accept) every single type 4 execution sequence
produced by the model. Likewise, since the events are
actually state transition events, the execution of such a given
sequence should drive the SUT from its initial state to one
of its final states that matches the state of the model that
consumes the same sequence.
We instrumented the SUT to accept the traces produced
by the model. We wrote a Java application that produced
concrete events from the abstract ones coming from Coun-
terExample To Execution Sequence module. At this stage
the generated events become ready to be imported by the
SUT. We note here that timeout events need special attention.
When a timeout event is encountered in the sequence, its
presence is used to ensure that the corresponding deadline
in the time module expires straight away. To ascertain what
state the SUT is in, we also instrumented it to reveal the
contents of its ROP sets. This way we are able to check
whether the ROP sets of the SUT match those of the model
as state transitions occur: a mismatch indicating a flaw in
the SUT. We are thus able to automate the testing of the
CCC.
As an example, we show the behaviour of the SUT
when the following fragment is presented as input:
푂퐹퐹퐸푅푇퐹 → 푂퐹퐹퐸푅푆 → 푃퐴푌 7퐷퐴푌푇푂
The SUT goes through correct state transitions. We begin
with the initial state where the seller’s ROP set indicates
that it has the right to make an offer, the buyer’s ROP set is
empty. The first attempt at offer fails; after a successful offer
event is encountered, the seller’s ROP set becomes empty
and the buyer is given a right to submit a purchase order
within seven days. However, no such operation is performed,
and the seven day timeout event occurs, and the buyer is
given a right to submit the purchase order within 10 days:
Type: init, Status: S
Seller ROP set:{ROPEntity-BO Type:OFFER, ROP Type:Right}
Buyer ROP set :{Empty}
Type: OFFER, Status: TF
Seller ROP set:{ROPEntity-BO Type:OFFER, ROP Type:Right}
Buyer ROP set :{Empty }
Type: OFFER, Status: S
Seller ROP set:{Empty }
Buyer ROP set:{ROPEntity-BO Type:PO7D, ROP Type:Right }
Type: PO7D, Status: TO
Seller ROP set:{Empty }
Buyer ROP set:{ROPEntity-BO Type:PO10D ROP Type:Right }
Suppose there is a flaw in the SUT: say the rule that deals
with the timeout of purchase order within seven days fails
to grant the buyer the right to submit the purchase order
within 10 days, then the ROP sets will be empty and will not
correspond to that of the model (the mismatch is detected).
Type: PO7D, Status: TO
Seller ROP set: {Empty }
Buyer ROP set: {Empty }
VI. RELATED WORK
Since the focus of our research is on functional testing, we
found standard LTL convenient for expressing correctness
requirement which are normally expressed as regular proper-
ties. The limitations of standard LTL to describe correctness
requirements used in structural testing, such as pre and post
conditions of procedure calls are pointed out in [19]. We
are also aware that not all correctness requirements can be
expressed in standard LTL; for instance, to express that a
certain property is true at every 푛푡ℎ state of the computation,
some extensions to standard LTL are needed [20]. Similarly,
[21] points out the limitation of standard LTL to express
(in a single LTL formula) constraints that span more than
one execution trace such as those that involve modified
condition/decision coverage.
The use of model–checking tools in combination with
LTL for checking whether the specification of a given
business process satisfies a set of compliance rules (for
example, Bank transactions larger than 10 thousand Euros
must be approved by the general manager.) is suggested
in [22]; however, the focus of this work is only on static
checking, whereas in ours, the interest is on run–time testing
of the actual system implementation to discover potential
errors in the implementations of both, the CCC and contract
clauses.
A salient feature of the CCC that we suggest is that
it is state–centric where states are determined by the sets
of pending (active) rights, obligation and prohibitions as-
sociated to contractual clauses. Thus it allows reasoning in
terms of what rights, obligations and prohibitions should
or should not be fulfilled and what intermediate states the
application will go through to reach a given critical state; the
advantages of being able to reason about individual states
and contractual clauses are also pointed out in [23].
We are aware of some of the disadvantages of model–
based testing; for instance, the usefulness of its test cases
heavily depends on the skills and creativity of the technical
person (not necessarily the same individual) that builds the
abstract model of the SUT and formulate the correctness
requirement in LTL; a practical guidance into the use of
model–based testing with its pros and cons is presented
in [24]. A potential problem with finite state machine (FSM)
based models is the limitations of FSMs to distinguish
between disjunctive and conjunctive choices in [25].
The use of model–checking tools like Spin and LTL for
checking correctness properties of asynchronous systems
such as Web services and contractual interactions has also
been explored in [26], [27]. In [26] they discuss how
WSAT (Web Service Analysis Tool) can be used to generate
a Promela specification of a web service composition whose
correctness properties can be formulated in LTL and verified
with Spin. A more recent paper [28], explores the use of
interface grammars to perform contract compliance run–time
testing of web service interfaces regulated by contractual
specifications such as Amazon Web Services.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have seen that contractual interactions can give rise to
highly complex execution patterns, and it is quite unrealistic
to assume that these can be produced manually for testing
purposes. Testing tool support is therefore needed at design
time to validate the consistency of the contractual clauses
and later, to produce test case validation sequences to
test the correctness of the actual implementation. We have
investigated what form this support should take.
Overall, we have found model checker based testing
techniques to be a very effective way of automating the
testing of contracting systems. We are able to build the
CCC model at a sufficiently high level of abstraction to
keep the state explosion problem under control, and yet
produce test sequences that are realistic enough for the
SUT. We are able to generate a range of test cases that can
include events of all possible status(unknown, matched and
mismatched, non–contract compliant, contract–compliant)
and test cases with events corresponding to the execution of
contract compliant operations only. We described how the
CCC can be instrumented to respond to these test cases and
indicate if its behaviour deviates from that of the model.
The knowledge gained from this work can be used for
building suitable testing tools for integrated development
environment for electronic contracting systems. This is left
as an item for future work.
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